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Introduction 
This paper presents a midterm review of third sector involvement in the delivery of the Work 
Programme. The Work Programme is a major national employment scheme and forms a central 
pillar of the Department of Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) attempts to reform the UK welfare system. 
The process through which provision has been contracted out to independent providers also 
embodies many aspects of the Coalition Government’s wider approach towards public services and 
commissioning (HM Government, 2011). As such, the Work Programme constitutes an important 
case, not only for those interested in the experiences of TSOs within employment services, but in 
public services reform and the third sector more generally.  
This article builds upon an initial evidence review conducted around the time of the programme’s 
launch, which focussed on the third sector’s role within UK employment services since 1997 (Damm, 
2012). The findings of that earlier review revealed a high level of concern within parts of the third 
sector over the Work Programme’s design and tendering process. Several features that TSOs had 
found problematic under previous employment programmes were due to be rolled out and 
expanded (i.e. NAO, 2010a; 2010b). The initial evidence review also concluded that despite repeated 
calls for more evidence within a UK context (TSTF, 2009; Aiken, 2007; WPC, 2009), the research base 
in this area remained underdeveloped (though see Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; and Wright et al., 
2011 for examples of international literature).  
The Work Programme therefore provides a significant opportunity to improve our understanding of 
the third sector in this field.  Two and half years into the programme’s operation, it is useful to 
review any additional evidence that has emerged and assess whether the early concerns have 
developed as anticipated. This will allow us to judge the extent to which third sector fears were 
justified and help to consolidate the available lessons for policy and practice. This ‘stock take’ of the 
available evidence will also help to suggest targets for future research.  
The following sections provide some theoretical and policy context to the Work Programme, an 
account of the literature reviewing process, and a brief outline of the programme’s design. The next 
sections then critically consider three issues that have been linked to the third sector in public and 
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academic debate. These are the idea of a third sector ‘squeeze’, mistreatment of subcontractors by 
prime providers, and the programme’s performance over the first two years. The conclusion 
summarises some of the key points, reflects upon the implications for the third sector and makes 
recommendations for future research.  
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Background 
In general terms, employment services are interventions delivered to unemployed individuals, 
usually in receipt of out of work benefits, to help them find a job. From 1997, the New Labour 
government increasingly contracted out services previously delivered by public agencies, echoing 
the previous Conservative government’s reforms in local community social care (Lewis, 1993). Early 
on, this was relatively small scale and providers delivered services similar to those of their public 
sector counterparts (Finn, 2009). As contracting expanded, however, contractors were gradually 
given more autonomy and paid according to how many individuals they helped to find employment 
(payment by results). By the time DWP introduced a new commissioning strategy in 2008, it 
described contracting as ‘business as usual’ (DWP 2008a, p. 11) and claimed it was worth over £1 
billion annually (DWP, 2008b). 
At the same time, the substance of employment services was changing. Payment by results 
frameworks implicitly encourage a ‘work first’ paradigm by incentivising short term, high turnover 
interventions aimed at getting benefit claimants into some form of employment as quickly as 
possible (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007). Interventions include CV and interview training, job-brokering 
and short term placements (e.g. Vegeris et al. 2011, p. 41). Increased ‘conditionality’ for the receipt 
of benefits also meant that participation was increasingly mandatory.  
The third sector was encouraged to participate in this agenda as part of New Labour’s wider 
enthusiasm for working in ‘partnership’, as codified in the 1998 Compact (Lewis, 2005). TSOs 
secured a reasonably large share of the new employment services contracts, some capitalising on 
their history of working with disadvantaged groups. In the New Deal for Disabled People job broker 
scheme, for example, the sector secured 42% of contracts (Stafford et al., 2007).  
In order to reduce the level of administration and risk the DWP faced through commissioning, 
however, and in accordance with recommendations from the Freud Report (2007), employment 
services were eventually consolidated into ‘prime’ contracts (DWP, 2007a; WPC 2009). This delivery 
model relies on fewer, larger ‘prime contractors’, who can then potentially subcontract local or 
specialist provision (DWP, 2008b). TSOs appeared to struggle to secure these larger contracts 
(Macdonald et al., 2007).  This left many smaller or specialist TSOs to seek subcontracts by ‘selling’ 
their contribution to prime providers, within a payment by results framework. Reports of negative 
experiences began to accumulate (WPC, 2009; WPC, 2010). Subcontractors complained about late 
payments from primes, high management fees, micromanagement, excessive risk transfers down 
supply chains, and primes monopolising business in house (WPC, 2010, 2011; NAO, 2010b).  
When the 2010 Coalition government announced the consolidation of most national employment 
schemes into a single programme, therefore, it did so against a backdrop of considerable concern 
within parts of the third sector (WPC, 2011).  Nevertheless, the Coalition government seemed keen 
to promote TSOs’ involvement, albeit at the subcontractor level.  The DWP hailed the presence of 
over 300 third sector subcontractors in primes’ bids as a “triumph for the big society” (DWP, 2011a). 
Chris Grayling, the then employment minister, referred to the list as a ‘who’s who’ of the charitable 
sector (in Third Sector, 2011). The third sector has also remained rhetorically in favour more widely 
as part of the Big Society agenda, which included a pledge to support third sector participation in 
contracting (PASC, 2011).  
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The Coalition’s 2011 Open Public Services White Paper, however, contained no specific measures to 
support TSOs, and professed no ‘ideological presumption’ towards any one sector (HM Government, 
2011). Some have also suggested that other potential means of support, such as the Public Services 
(Social Value) Act 2012, were watered down to ensure that no specific advantage was provided to 
third sector providers (Teasdale el al., 2012). The emphasis of Government policy has therefore 
shifted away from the idea of any group of providers offering distinctive added value, towards the 
benefits of competition, diversity and the commissioning process itself (Rees, 2014). In the Work 
Programme, commentators from the media (Butler, 2011; Toynbee, 2011), policy and academia 
(Crisp et al., 2011; WPC, 2011; Bennett, 2012), and representatives of third sector itself (NCVO, 
2012), have all suggested that despite the rhetoric, the third sector has been squeezed out of a 
central role.  
If true, then these issues feed into theoretical discussions surrounding the role and experiences of 
TSOs in a mixed economy of welfare. As Julian Le Grand pointed out two decades ago, the presence 
of non-profit providers are part of what distinguishes quasi-markets from their regular counterparts 
(1991). At the same time, their inclusion creates ambiguity over how classical market assumptions 
will function: “It makes little sense introducing a market to create profitable opportunities if the 
participants in the market are not interested in making profits” (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993, p. 30). 
In addition, evidence that contracting improves outcomes is also sparse (WPC, 2009; Davies, 2008; 
Audit Commission, 2007), and a great deal of scepticism was raised prior to the Work Programme’s 
launch over whether it would provide significant benefit to users (Mulheirn, 2011a; NAO, 2012). It is 
therefore debatable whether TSOs’ participation in such schemes offers a significant payoff to either 
themselves or their users, given the potential costs.  
Carmel and Harlock (2008) have suggested that third sector participants in contracting succeed only 
in supporting a neo-liberal agenda, concerned with spreading market forces to ever more areas of 
social life. Others suggest that TSOs are the ‘outriders’ or acceptable face of privatisation (Cleeveley, 
2006 in Davies, 2011). There is a risk, therefore, that by participating in such an agenda, some TSOs 
sacrifice their claim to help form an independent sector with a distinct ethos and identity. Aiken and 
Bode (2009) record through a case study approach the risk of organisations moving towards a short 
term focus on results and formal accountability, over traditional community links. This reflects a 
much wider literature warning of the potentially negative effects of contracting on the autonomy 
and financial security of TSOs (Lewis, 1996; Morris, 1999; Seddon, 2007; Cunningham and James, 
2007). 
The remainder of this paper will therefore help to assess these concerns in the context of third 
sector involvement in the Work Programme, both in terms of the impact on TSOs themselves and 
their contribution towards tackling unemployment.   
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Literature review strategy 
The scope of the initial evidence review included all UK literature with a substantive focus on third 
sector involvement in government funded employment programmes (Damm, 2012).  The search 
strategy combined a mixture of key word searches using search engines and academic databases, 
supplemented by snowball sampling using references. With some exceptions, previous academic 
attention in the UK has been limited, and although the situation is now changing, much of the 
available literature was from policy and practice. DWP programme evaluations, government 
command papers and press releases provided much of the historical policy context, albeit from a 
clearly promotional perspective. Reports from bodies such as the Work and Pensions Committee 
(WPC, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) and National Audit Office (NAO, 2010a, 2010b) also provided both 
original evidence and important critical commentary, while TSOs and their representatives produced 
a range of reviews and initial surveys, largely aimed towards lobbying policy makers (NCVO, 2011; 
ACEVO, 2011).  
Since the Work Programme’s launch, the empirical data available has increased significantly and was 
included on the same basis as above. As well as further useful contributions from the WPC (2013) 
and NAO (2012), limited amounts of performance data have now been released alongside the initial 
findings of the DWP evaluation (Newton et al. 2012; Lane et al., 2013). The latter provides valuable 
qualitative detail, though with a typically technical focus. Further surveys by third sector umbrella 
organisations have also been published based on TSOs’ actual experiences of delivery (e.g. NCVO, 
2012). Finally, original and independent qualitative research has also been undertaken: previously a 
major gap in the literature (Rees et al. 2013; Bennett, 2012).    
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The Work Programme: key features 
The Work Programme launched in July 2011 and has a number of notable features, many of which 
were developed or proposed during New Labour’s time in office (see DWP, 2008b), but have been 
implemented on a larger and accelerated scale. 
Key features include: 
Single programme: The Work Programme replaced a plethora of existing schemes for different out-
of-work benefits, and commissioned providers to work instead with the full range of claimant types.  
The prime model: England, Scotland and Wales are divided into 18 contract package areas (CPAs). In 
each area, long-term out-of-work benefit claimants are randomly allocated to one of 2 or 3 prime 
contractors.   
Payment by results: Providers receive only a small attachment fee for referrals and the first 
significant payment is received only once a ‘job outcome’ is achieved: usually when a user achieves 
employment for a period of 26 weeks (sometimes 13). Further payments are received if this 
outcome is sustained over a longer period. Around 90% of primes’ payment is therefore outcome 
dependent, a significant increase compared to previous schemes (DWP, 2011b).  
Differential payments: In order to address concerns in previous schemes that some clients were 
being written off and neglected by providers, payment fees were set at a higher level for some 
groups of users (customer groups) depending on their current and previous benefit type.  
Black box approach: In return for the considerable risk adopted by providers, they were promised 
flexibility over how they designed and operated their services. They were also given a longer (two-
year) period with which to work with clients.  
Competition: Whereas the Work Programme’s predecessor, the Flexible New Deal, had elements of 
user choice built into the design, referrals between primes within CPAs are entirely random. This 
allows an unbiased comparison of their performance, and the DWP has the contractual option to 
reallocate market share to the better-performing primes via the referrals mechanism.  
Minimum performance targets (MPTs): Primes were set challenging minimum targets, below which 
they would be in contractual breach and unlikely to break even.  DWP set MPTs for job outcomes 
10% higher than they predicted would have occurred without the Work Programme.  
Supply chains: Different organisations fulfil a variety of roles within the Work Programme. It is 
helpful to distinguish between three broad groups, despite a slightly more complex reality. These are 
primes, tier one, and tier two providers. As noted above, primes hold contracts directly with the 
DWP and receive referrals from the Job Centre Plus (JCP). They can deliver support in house or 
subcontract to ‘tier one’ providers. Both primes and tier one providers generally take responsibility 
for the user throughout the ensuing two-year period or until a sustained job outcome is achieved 
(end to end provision). They also generally work with all of the different customer groups.  
End to end providers then have the option to refer users to ‘tier two’ subcontractors, which provide 
specific, ancillary interventions. These include assessments, short training courses and treatments 
for addiction or health problems. Tier two organisations often specialise in a particular client group 
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such as the elderly, ex-offenders or people with disabilities; and in contrast to tier ones they are not 
generally guaranteed any flows of referrals.  A model of the supply chain principle is shown in Figure 
One below (see also Rees et al., 2013).  
Figure One: Supply chain model  
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Has the third sector been squeezed out of delivery? 
One of the first concerns raised about the Work Programme was whether or not TSOs were being 
systematically disadvantaged during the commissioning process. A report by the Work and Pensions 
Committee (WPC) pointed out that previous moves towards the prime model led to a reduction in 
the number of TSOs able to take on contracts directly with the DWP, even when they had a 
successful history of doing so (WPC, 2011; see also McDonald et al., 2007). Various potential barriers 
to participation within the Work Programme at the subcontractor level were also identified, which 
led to the suggestion that there had been a third sector ‘squeeze’ (Simmonds, 2011a; The 
Independence Panel, 2012, 2013).  
At the prime level, these concerns appear to have been justified. Out of 40 prime contracts, only two 
can reasonably be said to have gone to third sector providers. One of these, Rehab JobFit, is part-
owned by the multinational private company Interserve. The other, the Career Development Group, 
operates in a partnership with a private sector organisation. This can be compared to previous 
schemes where the third sector held around 40-50% of direct contracts (Hills et al., 2001; Stafford et 
al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2007; Armstrong et al., 2010). One contract was awarded to Newcastle 
College Group, a further education college, while the remainder went to large private sector 
corporations specialising in the welfare to work industry or public sector contracting generally.  
This is not particularly surprising given that a minimum turnover of £20 million was required to gain 
entry onto the ‘Framework for the Provision of Employment Related Support Services’, which in turn 
allowed providers to bid for a prime contract. This requirement was intended to ensure 
organisations had the necessary cash flow and ability to bear risk. Even without this official barrier, 
compared to predecessor schemes, Work Programme prime contracts involved a wider range of 
clients, larger geographical areas, higher performance targets, a more conditional payment model 
and fewer contracts (Lane et al. 2013). As a result, Rees et al. (2013) suggest that TSOs may have 
been disproportionately discouraged from bidding by the capacity required, high risks, a lack of 
commissioning expertise, and a relative lack of access to capital. Some potential providers also 
raised the issue of a potential conflict between their values and the requirements of the prime role, 
or more pragmatically, a risk to their charity ‘brand’ as campaigning, mission-driven organisations.  
In other words the prime role does not appear suited to the characteristics of the vast majority of 
TSOs in this area (see also TSTF, 2009; WPC, 2009). This problem is not unique to the third sector, 
however, and appears to result from a general consolidation of the welfare to work market 
favouring larger suppliers. As the Centre for Social and Economic Inclusion (CESI) have shown, 36% of 
the Work Programme is delivered by just two providers: Ingeus Deloitte and A4e (Simmonds, 2011a). 
Only 8% went to new market entrants, despite several high profile bids. Large, established 
contracting organisations appear to be the main beneficiaries of the open public services agenda, 
despite attracting controversy in various areas, including, in the case of A4E, alleged fraudulent 
activity and poor quality services (CPA, 2012; WPC, 2010). Given that an estimated 43.1% of 
provision is delivered by primes in-house, the general contraction of the welfare to work market and 
the wider context of public austerity, it is not surprising that smaller organisations of all kinds have 
felt squeezed.  
However, whilst prime contracts are firmly beyond the reach of most TSOs, this could have been 
somewhat compensated for by a significant presence at the subcontractor level. The Government 
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has been keen to rebut the idea of a third sector squeeze and to stress just “how big a role the 
voluntary sector is playing” (DWP, 2012). At least ostensibly, the distribution of subcontracts does 
seem to provide a more positive picture for third sector providers. Table One below shows that at 
both tier one and tier two, third sector providers are well represented (though as discussed below, 
the tier two figures are arguably misleading) (DWP, 2012).  
Due to the lack of available data, however, there are considerable gaps in our knowledge. Without 
the number of applications made by organisations from different sectors, it is difficult to judge 
whether the number of TSOs involved can be considered a ‘success’ for supporters of third sector 
involvement. These figures also fail to reveal market share, as the number of contracts may not be 
proportionate to the number of referrals or the value of the contracts. Based on the content of 
primes’ bids, CESI estimated that the two third sector primes and the 153 tier ones would account 
for 18.3% of referrals (Simmonds, 2011a). A one off stock take by the DWP early in the programme 
confirmed a third sector market share of around 20% (2011c). Excluding the two primes, however, 
would give a much lower, currently unknown, figure. Furthermore, the idea of a squeeze implies a 
downwards trend, but there is no data available which allows us to determine how market share 
compares to the Work Programme’s two main predecessors: Pathways to Work and the Flexible 
New Deal. In several ways, therefore, the picture is incomplete.  
Table One: Number of subcontracts held by sector, November 2012 
Qualitative evidence, however, does suggest that despite their delivery experience, some potential 
third sector subcontractors were put off bidding by the risks and required investment associated 
with payment by results, concerns over financial viability and the uncertain volume of referrals (Lane 
et al., 2013). Some organisations may even have turned down contracts for similar reasons, rather 
than being ‘squeezed out’ as such (NCVO, 2011). Furthermore, those that did tender found the 
process to be a heavy administrative burden (Crisp et al., 2011). Organisations were often required 
to bid to multiple potential primes in a CPA, all with different tendering procedures (WPC, 2011). A 
survey of Third Sector European Network members (TSEN, now part of the NCVO), found that 64% of 
respondents felt they were asked to include too much information (Simmonds, 2011b; see also 
NCVO, 2011).  
For some potential third sector providers, therefore, there appear to have been considerable 
obstacles to participation, often related to their limited size and capacity. The concerns raised over 
participation at the prime level appear justified, and there is qualitative evidence of further barriers 
at the subcontractor level. It remains a point of debate whether or not this development should be a 
concern for the programme’s architects. As the Minister for Civil Society argued, the aim of the Work 
Programme is not to support TSOs (Hurd in Wiggins, 2012).  At an aggregate level, however, these 
trends may reduce the amount of specialist or local expertise within the programme. For TSOs 
themselves, those squeezed out of the prime level will have been forced to accommodate 
themselves as subcontractors, and face the issues discussed in the next section. Some of those 
forced out entirely could subsequently face financial pressures and reduced capacity to deliver 
services, depending on their reliance on this policy area for their funding (Crisp et al. 2011).   
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Are subcontractors mistreated by prime contractors? 
As noted above, subcontracting within employment services does not appear to have been a 
positive experience for some third sector providers under  previous employment schemes (WPC, 
2010; Hudson et al., 2010; NAO, 2010b). Unsurprisingly, therefore, there was concern that similar 
negative experiences would be repeated within the Work Programme (WPC, 2011; NCVO, 2011). In 
an attempt to address these fears, the DWP’s 2008 commissioning strategy specified a code of 
conduct for primes, and promised that the DWP would act as a market steward to protect 
subcontractors. To fulfil this claim, whilst maintaining the black box model, the department 
ultimately established the Merlin Standard: an accreditation process and mediation service for 
disputes. Somewhat ironically, this accountability process has itself been outsourced to emqc Ltd, a 
private organisation. The Coalition Government has made accreditation compulsory for all Work 
Programme Primes, and all have since been found compliant (WPC, 2013).  
To date, it does appear that some of the worst excesses from previous schemes have been avoided. 
Nevertheless, respondents to the latest WPC (2013) report were still concerned that Merlin lacked 
sufficient sanctioning powers to enforce decisions. Similarly, a survey conducted by the National 
Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO, 2011) at the start of the Work Programme found that 
only 29% of respondents thought Merlin provided even partially adequate protection for 
subcontractors. A report on the independence of the voluntary sector, funded by the Baring 
Foundation, has also censured the Work Programme on associated fronts (The Independence Panel, 
2012). The authors of the report were particularly critical of a perceived lack of viable referrals, 
excessive risk for subcontractors and an absence of genuine negotiation during the tendering 
process. The panel also drew attention to so called ‘gagging clauses’ within subcontracts, which they 
interpret as prohibiting criticism of the programme, primes or the DWP. This is clearly a concern for 
delivery organisations with an advocacy or campaigning remit, though it is not entirely clear how 
common these clauses are, or the extent of their influence in practice.  
As the WPC (2013) report concludes, however, the root of much of the concern around 
subcontractor treatment seems to be primarily about the limits to Merlin’s remit rather than a lack 
enforcement powers.  Specifically, it is not able to prevent subcontractors from signing up to 
undesirable terms and conditions in the first place. Nick Hurd, the Minister for Civil Society, 
provocatively argued that charities couldn’t expect the Government to “hold hands all the time” (in 
Wiggens, 2012). Whereas primes’ tenders are publically available, we know little about the content 
of most subcontracts, which makes it difficult to assess the terms and conditions subcontractors are 
operating under. Some TSOs do appear to have been negotiating from a weak position, however, 
and 53% of respondents to the TSEN survey felt they were offered terms on a take it or leave it basis 
(Crisp et al., 2011).  
At the tier one level, one of the most prominent complaints relates to the payment model and the 
associated level of risk (WPC, 2013). It was originally claimed that a central benefit of the prime 
model would be that the larger primes would absorb some of the risk of payment by results on 
behalf of their subcontractors (DWP, 2008b).  In practice, the official DWP evaluation for the Work 
Programme found that almost all tier one providers operate on broadly the same funding model as 
primes, and therefore experience no less risk (Lane et al., 2013). Additionally, subcontractors have to 
bear the risk of their prime failing or losing market share due to poor performance, regardless of 
their own outcomes. 
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Arguably, this scenario stems from the DWP’s own efforts to transfer risk onto prime providers. 
Primes have to cope not only with the risks of the outcome focussed payment regime, but also 
uncertain levels of referrals and a challenging economic context. Pattison (2012) suggests that 
payment by results is particularly risky in the Work Programme due to the importance of external 
factors, such as the economy, and the unclear link between interventions and job outcomes. 
Evidence to the WPC and the DWP evaluation suggests that primes have struggled to bankroll 
provision for higher than expected numbers of Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) related referrals, 
highlighting the difficulty of forecasting these levels years in advance (WPC, 2013; Lane et al., 2013). 
In this context it seems almost inevitable that primes would attempt to share these risks with 
subcontractors, even if doing so does raises fundamental questions about their role within the 
welfare to work market. Both the Social Market Foundation (Mulheirn, 2011b) and Committee of 
Public Accounts (CPA, 2012) have questioned whether the DWP’s strategy makes sense in the long 
term. Although the DWP can transfer short term financial risk; the risks of underperformance and 
the subsequent social consequences remain.  
The second major complaint is more applicable to the tier two providers and concerns the level of 
referrals received from primes. Surveys by the Third Sector Research Centre (TSRC), the BBC and 
NCVO suggest that despite the figures in Table 1 above, very few tier two organisations are actually 
involved in the programme’s delivery (Rees et al., 2013; BBC in WPC, 2013; NCVO 2012). Some 
respondents to the TSRC phone survey were not even aware that they were listed as subcontractors 
(Rees et al., 2013). Similarly, 40% of respondents to the BBC did not consider themselves part of the 
Work Programme and a further 41% of those that did had received no referrals (WPC, 2013). NCVO 
found that over 50% of subcontractors, usually at tier two, had received less than ten referrals or 
none at all (2012). There is therefore strong evidence that primes are not referring to their specialist 
subcontractors, who lack any contractually guaranteed flows. Clearly, this scenario may have 
contributed to the idea of a third sector squeeze, as specialist organisations find themselves 
excluded from delivery despite ostensibly holding a contract. Additionally, some TSOs that are not 
listed as subcontractors felt that they were providing services to Work Programme registered clients 
as part of their normal work, but that the prime would subsequently be the one to profit if a job 
outcome were achieved (WPC, 2013).  
One possible explanation for the lack of specialist referrals is that primes themselves have not 
received sufficient numbers of clients who require these interventions (Lane et al., 2013). Simmonds 
(2012) notes JSA referrals were 15% higher than expected after the first year, referrals of health 
related benefit claimants were only 37% of those anticipated. One possible cause of these low rates 
is the appeal rate for the Work Capability Assessment, which determines an incapacity benefit 
claimant’s fitness for work and indirectly their eligibility to participate in the Work Programme. The 
DWP has faced major criticism over the assessment process, with nearly 40% of appeals proving 
successful (CPA, 2013); though it should be noted that this does not tell us the overall rate of 
appeals. The DWP has responded by announcing that its long term contractor, another private firm 
called ATOS healthcare, will lose its monopoly and face new competition.  
The almost complete absence of specialist referrals, however, suggests a further explanation is 
needed. As mentioned above, there appears to be a generally low level of resources for delivery 
within the programme. End to end providers may simply lack the resources necessary to fund these 
relatively expensive, intensive interventions because of the way the programme is designed. End to 
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end providers therefore appear to either keep these referrals in house, or refer users to existing 
public services funded from other sources wherever possible (Lane et al., 2013; Rees et al., 2013). It 
is unclear whether primes knew this would be the case when they were assembling their bids, and 
hence whether third sector tier two providers were used as ‘bid candy’ or ‘window dressing’ (WPC, 
2011). The DWP evaluation found “little evidence” of bad faith (Lane et al., 2013, p.19), but many 
tier two providers do feel as though they were misled (WPC, 2013). Clearly, this has implications for 
these specialist third sector providers, who are lending their brand and legitimacy to the programme 
without any substantial return to themselves.  
The net impact of these difficulties upon the third sector as a whole is difficult to gauge due to the 
diversity of TSOs experiences. The NCVO survey found that 47% of respondents felt their contract 
was at risk of failure within 6 months, and a further 26% by the end of the programme (2012). The 
results, however, are not presented in a way that reveals how many of these are tier one or tier two 
organisations respectively. Rees et al. (2013) argue that subcontractors’ experiences are related to 
factors besides their sector, including their role, but also their prime, location and individual contract 
terms. How they coped with these experiences was in turn mediated by factors such as size, culture 
and how dependent the organisation was on the welfare to work field. For some TSOs, a lack of 
referrals is a frustration, but ultimately Work Programme activity constitutes only a small proportion 
of their overall workload (ACEVO, 2011). For others that are more dependent on the programme for 
funding, the same scenario could have major structural implications for staffing and organisational 
survival. We also know that at least some organisations appear to be coping well within their 
operating environment and have a positive relationship with their primes (NCVO, 2012; Lane et al., 
2012; Rees et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, some organisations appear to have been much more capable of negotiating favourable 
terms than others (Rees et al., 2013). This will depend on factors such as an organisations’ resource 
base, negotiating experience and reputation for delivery (Alcock et al., 2004; Cunningham, 2008). 
Those less dependent on the welfare to work market may also have been more able to walk away 
from what they considered unacceptable contracts. Alternatively, some organisations appear to 
have taken difficult strategic decisions in order to remain viable, such as expanding the scope of 
their customer base in order to secure non-specialist, tier one contracts. Although this is arguably an 
astute response to a changing environment, it also raises questions around identity and mission for 
these organisations. TSOs are not just passive victims, but are themselves strategic agents with 
various options available and difficult decisions to make within a changing policy field. 
Taken in aggregate, however, the current trend may suggest that specialist third sector providers are 
now less able to secure funding within government-funded employment services, unless they widen 
their user base. Similarly, although they have a higher level of security, tier one organisations may 
also be unable to deliver the more intensive interventions themselves due to a general lack of 
resources. This would pose a fundamental shift in practice away from the ‘specialist experience and 
skills’ repeatedly advocated by the DWP in its statements on commissioning from the third sector 
under New Labour (DWP, 2006; 2007b; 2010), and supports the idea that commissioning has 
become more about risk reduction and cost savings (Rees, 2014). It would also mean a further move 
for some third sector organisations from work placement and social integration based schemes with 
which they were historically associated (Aiken and Bode, 2009).   
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How has the Work Programme performed? 
To fully understand the role and experiences of TSOs within the Work Programme, it is important to 
explore the wider context within which they deliver, and in particular the outcomes achieved by the 
programme so far for its unemployed users. Some commentators expressed doubt early on about 
the anticipated performance levels expected by the DWP. Using Flexible New Deal data as a 
predictor of primes’ performance, the Social Market Foundation (SMF) predicted that providers 
would severely undershoot their targets (Mulheirn, 2011a). SMF director, Ian Mulheirn has since 
claimed the targets were “wishful thinking” and that the DWP was attempting to build a “macho 
image” (in WPC, 2013, p.14). The National Audit Office came to a similar conclusion, again using 
Flexible New Deal data (NAO, 2012). CESI, in contrast, felt that the targets were feasible, but only 
depending on the developing state of the economy (2011).  
There was also significant pessimism within the third sector. Only 8% of TSOs that responded to an 
ACEVO survey at the start of the programme were confident that the MPTs in their area would be 
met (ACEVO, 2011). There was particular scepticism that sufficient resources would be available for 
the most disadvantaged client groups, and only 9% of respondents felt differential payments would 
be effective (see also WPC, 2011). Given that some of the respondents were themselves providers, 
this potentially indicates a lack of confidence that they would be able to achieve significant results 
within the framework of the programme.  
Setting appropriate targets for major employment programmes is an inherently difficult process. It 
requires the DWP to predict flows of referrals, primes’ costs, and their likely performance in 
uncertain economic and labour market conditions (NAO, 2012). First, the DWP estimated the 
number of job outcomes that would be achieved without the Work Programme.  Unless primes 
outperformed this level, or operated at well below the anticipated costs, they would not break even 
under the payment model. As primes estimated their costs would be 30% higher than the DWP had 
predicted, even higher performances were likely to be required (NAO, 2012). Second, the DWP set 
contractual minimum targets at 10% above the non-intervention level for the three largest payment 
groups, requiring a standard of performance that exceeded the New Deal programmes during the 
boom years of 2001 to 2008 (WPC, 2011). In order to win contracts, many primes went even further 
and offered significant ‘discounts’ on their fees, under the expectation that they could later 
compensate through higher performance. Finally, an annual reduction in the attachment fee was 
included in the design, with their complete removal due in April 2014 (WPC, 2013). Clearly, these 
factors all combine to form an extremely challenging financial framework. 
The minimum performance targets were designed by the DWP to be measured at set points in the 
programme’s development. As Table Two below shows, the first was set for the initial ten months 
from 1st June 2011 to 31st March 2012, and the second from 1st April 2012 to 31st of March 2013 
(DWP, 2013a). In the first period, all primes fell far short of the minimum performance levels. 
Overall, only 3.6% of users secured job outcomes in this period, compared to a 9.7% minimum 
performance target, as calculated by the NAO (2012). The results were even worse than the 
calculated non-intervention rate, resulting in a storm of negative publicity and claims from the 
Labour opposition that the Work Programme was ‘worse than doing nothing’ (Byrne in Ross, 2012). 
The results for the second period showed considerable improvement, though providers still fell short 
of the minimum targets, especially for new claimants of Employment Support Allowance (ESA), a 
health related benefit.  In both cases, however, there was considerable variation between providers, 
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and some primes have now met their JSA minimum targets for the first time. The latest results 
suggest that performance continues to improve as the programme progresses (DWP, 2013b). 
Overall, therefore, the programme may avoid fulfilling the initial predictions of catastrophic failure, 
but has proved severely disappointing for the hardest to help payment groups.  
Table Two: Job outcome levels as a proportion of referrals (MPT in parentheses) 
It is also questionable whether the most disadvantaged individuals have received even a basic level 
of services. Providers of contracted out employment services have a history of focussing their 
resources on the clients most likely to trigger outcome payments (creaming), while neglecting those 
with the most challenging barriers to work (parking) (Hudson et al., 2010; WPC, 2010).  Differential 
outcome payments were introduced in the Work Programme to try and incentivise providers not to 
park but, two years into the programme, all the available evidence suggests that providers continue 
to focus their resources on the users with the smallest distance from the labour market (Rees et al., 
2014; Newton et al., 2012; WPC, 2013). Some have suggested the incentives are simply too low to 
make a difference to behaviour (Mulheirn in WPC, 2013). Within each claimant group, successful 
outcome payments need to fund the provision not just for the users who achieve those outcomes, 
but for the entire cohort. Perversely, as there are fewer successful job outcomes in the more 
challenging customer groups, funding is therefore in practice lower per user in these groups despite 
differential payments (Simmonds, 2013; Newton et al. 2012). Parking, therefore, may be less a 
matter of ill intent from providers, and more a matter of necessity within a highly performance 
dependent payment regime. 
These findings all have important implications for third sector providers. First, underperformance is 
likely to exacerbate some of the issues discussed in the previous sections, including a lack of 
specialist services, greater pressure on primes to pass on risk, and fewer resources for end to end 
third sector providers to secure outcomes for their beneficiaries. Due to payment by results and 
lower than expected outcomes, the DWP has paid out considerably less in fees than it initially 
anticipated (WPC, 2013). This means that funding is forced into a downwards spiral when arguably it 
is needed most (SMF, 2012). As ESA claimants trigger higher fees for job outcomes, disappointing 
results for this group will further compound the effect, and higher than anticipated JSA referrals 
means that what funding is available needs to be spread further. Some providers are reporting case 
loads of 100 users per advisor (WPC, 2013), and are adopting less intensive forms of provision such 
as group sessions and online support, reportedly as a way of creating cost savings (Lane et al., 2013).  
This is clearly at odds with the “intensive, individualised support” envisaged in the Freud Report, 
which recommended many of the moves towards the current prime model (Freud, 2007, p.6). It also 
raises difficult questions for TSOs. Many were ostensibly set up precisely in order to help the most 
disadvantaged individuals (TSTF, 2009; Crisp et al., 2011). Yet these same organisations could find 
that creaming and parking provides the only viable strategy to break even within the current 
payment structure. Even with the improved performance for some customer groups, it is also clear 
that the Work Programme does not provide a radical solution to long term structural employment, 
or the barriers faced by disadvantaged groups (Grover, 2009). TSOs face high levels of risk and 
potentially financial hardship due to the poor performance of the programme, seemingly with little 
return for their most disadvantaged beneficiaries.  
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It is possible that, underneath the headline figures, third sector providers are in fact providing higher 
quality services than their counterparts from other sectors, perhaps cross subsidising services and 
going beyond the contract. Unfortunately, there is little current evidence for this form of distinctive 
delivery. A study by the National Consumer Council (Hopkins et al. 2007) did find that users rated 
third sector providers higher on some measures, but it is difficult to apply their findings to the 
context of the Work Programme. Evaluations of previous schemes tend not to make comparisons 
between providers, but they have found that the funding model almost always determines the level 
of strategic behaviour (Loumidis et al., 2001; Griffiths and Durkin, 2007), particularly when 
organisations are under financial pressure (Hudson et al., 2010; NAO, 2010, 2010b; Stafford et al., 
2007). Currently there are no data available about the performance of subcontractors, and unless 
this situation changes, it is difficult to envisage this current gap in our knowledge being addressed.  
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Conclusions 
This paper has examined much of the available evidence on the Work Programme, with a focus on 
the experiences of third sector providers. The analysis centred around three themes which are 
particularly pertinent to TSOs: their potential exclusion from the programme, their experiences as 
subcontractors, and the degree to which the Work Programme has delivered for their users. The key 
findings are emphasised in this conclusion.  
First, it is clear from both quantitative and qualitative evidence that almost all third sector providers 
are too small to compete at the prime level. Although not unique to TSOs, this marks a major shift in 
the welfare to work market. At the subcontractor level too, barriers have been identified that 
prevent smaller organisations from securing contracts. For those previously reliant on this form of 
funding, this clearly has financial implications. It will also influence the makeup of the current 
provider base. Larger, more generalist, professionalised TSOs, with experience of the commissioning 
process, are more likely to be suited to the new environment.  
The experience of those that have secured contracts is more mixed. On the positive side, the most 
egregious examples of subcontractor mistreatment seen in previous programmes do not yet appear 
to have resurfaced under the Work Programme. Tier one providers also appear to enjoy a relative 
degree of security within the programme, though they face many of the same risks and financial 
strains as primes, including a general squeeze on service funding.  In contrast, specialist tier two 
subcontractors have had very little practical involvement. This appears to stem from either a lack of 
resources or insufficient incentives to provide intensive interventions. Again, this will affect the 
sustainability of some organisations, but will also shift the nature of services within the programme.  
Finally, although the performance of the programme has improved from a disappointing start, the 
experience of the most disadvantaged clients remains a serious concern. The design features 
intended to reduce perverse incentives do not appear to have been successful. The poor results raise 
serious questions for TSOs, many of whom will count the most disadvantaged individuals as their 
core beneficiaries. They face either being frozen out of the welfare to work field entirely, or 
participating within a framework that lacks the resources or incentives to properly serve all 
beneficiaries.  
These findings link back to the earlier discussion about the role of the third sector within 
employment services. In his recent work, Le Grand suggests that both altruistic and self-interested 
motivations can be harnessed simultaneously (2010). In a well designed, ‘robust’ quasi-market, there 
would be no conflict between mission-driven behaviour and a rational, profit-driven strategy. The 
difficulties concerning creaming and parking discussed above, and incentives to move towards non-
specialist provision, however, demonstrate that in practice such dilemmas are commonplace. 
At the same time, participation may have unintended consequences for the TSOs themselves, as 
they seek to maintain their mission and claimed distinctiveness. The evidence from previous 
schemes suggests that once embedded within the internal logic of a quasi market, the payment 
model is by far the most powerful determinant of behaviour, regardless of sector (Griffiths and 
Durkin 2007; Hudson et al. 2010; Stafford et al. 2007). Furthermore, the current form of payment by 
results implicitly encourages work first style interventions by rewarding fast outcomes and a high 
client turnover (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007). There is little space in the current paradigm for the 
 17 
 
longer term community integration approaches traditionally associated with the third sector: a social 
inclusion first model (Aiken, 2007, Aiken and Bode, 2009). 
An alternative strategy for these organisations might be a more prominent emphasis on 
campaigning. Most third sector lobbying appears to date to have focussed on TSOs’ own experiences 
and market position. As Davies (2008) has pointed out, this focus can distract from the impact the 
changed commissioning environment has had on unemployed individuals. A different approach may 
be to advocate changes to the design of future welfare to work programmes, perhaps for greater 
user choice, as recommended by the WPC (2013). This could potentially mitigate parking, as users 
could at least in theory seek out specialist providers of their own accord. An increase in the level of 
voice given to users is another potential objective. We currently know very little about the users 
who do not secure job outcomes, or those who appear to have been parked (CPA, 2012).  
The most significant implications of the Work Programme, therefore, may be yet to come. The 
programme’s design already appears to have influenced proximate fields such as family intervention, 
and elements look set to be rolled out in probation, and the drugs and alcohol treatment field. If 
TSOs are able to use their experiences to alter how these future programmes develop, then the 
advantages for their beneficiaries could be substantial. There are already some suggestions that the 
commissioning process will be altered in future (WPC, 2013; Lane et al., 2013; HM Government, 
2010, 2012). 
In terms of future research, several potential gaps have emerged from this review. Many of these 
relate to the lack of available data at the subcontractor level, with worrying implications for public 
accountability and transparency. The DWP and other departments should be encouraged to release 
performance and referral data at all levels of the programme, not just for primes. This would have 
the additional benefit of revealing which organisations are actually involved in the Work Programme 
in practice. Data on which organisations unsuccessfully applied for subcontracts, or secured 
contracts with unsuccessful primes, would also considerably help to improve our understanding of 
the third sector’s role within the market.  
If no new data from the DWP does become available, then primary research may be able to address 
some of the same issues, despite commercial confidentiality and potential contractual restrictions 
on releasing data.  In particular, access to the content of the subcontracts themselves would clearly 
be useful, and this could perhaps be negotiated with individual organisations (see Morris, 2000).  
There is also currently a lack of in depth research focused on the actual services which TSOs deliver 
and the experience of users. Finally, there is a need for further longitudinal research, which follows 
organisations throughout the commissioning process. The Work Programme remains only half way 
through its projected lifetime, and its long term impact will be followed with considerable interest 
by third sector scholars.  
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